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The 2016 Amendments to Singapore’s Consumer Protection 
(Fair Trading) Act — A Missed Opportunity 
WEE LING LOO* AND EE ING ONG** 
Abstract: 
Singapore has recently amended its Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act in 
response to calls for tougher action against unscrupulous traders. The revisions were 
aimed at strengthening the government’s ability to deter and punish errant traders, 
with a focus on deterrence. To this end, the government introduced new investigatory 
powers, enhanced court powers and added one substantive consumer remedy. Despite 
this, the authors argue that Singapore’s consumer protection regime remains 
inadequate because: unfair practices have yet to attract criminal sanctions; no 
guidelines were issued to provide transparency and clarity on how the broad 
investigatory powers and harsher court powers are to be implemented; no measures 
to encourage reform were introduced; and consumer remedies remain insufficient. In 
this article, the revisions are discussed with a comparison to the Hong Kong and 
Australian regimes. Suggestions for further reform are then made for the purpose of 
achieving a more robust and comprehensive consumer protection regime. 
 
 
I    Introduction 
 
Singapore has recently amended the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (cap 
52A, 2009 rev ed) (‘CP(FT)A’) in response to calls for tougher action against 
unscrupulous traders. For ease of reference, the CP(FT)A prior to the 2016 
amendments shall be referred to as the ‘previous CP(FT)A’ and the amended one as 
the ‘2016 CP(FT)A’. News of vulnerable consumers being taken advantage of at a 
popular electronic gadgets mall partly precipitated the outcry.1 A notable case 
involved a Vietnamese tourist who had sought to purchase an iPhone 6 for SGD950.2 
Not being fluent in the language, he signed an agreement in English without reading 
it. He had also agreed to a one-year product warranty having assumed that it was free. 
The tourist had a rude shock when he was not allowed to leave with the phone without 
paying an additional SGD1500 in ‘warranty fees’, which the signed agreement 
obliged him to pay. In a widely circulated video, he knelt before the storeowner to beg 
for his SGD950 back. His girlfriend rejected the storeowner’s subsequent offer of 
SGD600 refund and called the police. In front of the police, however, the storeowner 
raised the signed agreement in defence and reduced their offer to SGD70. The police 
referred the matter to the Consumer Association of Singapore (‘CASE’) which only 
obtained a SGD400 refund.3  
                                                 
*  Practice Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
**  Lecturer of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
The authors thank Associate Professor Low Kee Yang and Assistant Professor Alvin See for their insightful comments 
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1  Foo Jie Ying, ‘Consumer Protection Act to get more Bite?’, The New Paper (Singapore), 16 May 2016 
<http://www.tnp.sg/news/singapore-news/consumer-protection-act-get-more-bite>. 
2  Chew Hui Min, ‘Vietnamese Tourist Kneels and Begs for Refund of iPhone 6 at Sim Lim Square’, The Straits Times 
(Singapore), 4 November 2014 <http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/vietnamese-tourist-kneels-and-begs-for-
refund-of-iphone-6-at-sim-lim-square-0>. 
3  Ibid. 
  
 
 
This, and other similar incidents, have reinforced a common public perception that the 
then-existing consumer protection laws provided insufficient protection for 
consumers.4 In particular, errant traders who had been blacklisted by authorities or 
given injunctions to restrain their unfair practices often simply changed their 
companies’ names or set up new ones ‘to escape the black mark’.5 Thus, in 2015, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore (‘MTI’) embarked on a review of the 
consumer protection framework. In the process, Hong Kong and Australian practices 
were studied and relevant stakeholders consulted.6 On 13 September 2016,7 revisions 
to the previous CP(FT)A8 were passed and came into operation on 9 December 2016.9  
 
The revisions were aimed at strengthening the deterrent effect of the CP(FT(A).10 The 
ultimate goal was for unfair practices to be deterred altogether, or in situations where 
deterrence is unsuccessful, be resolved through negotiation, mediation or trader’s 
voluntary compliance agreements (‘VCAs’).11 To achieve this, a new administering 
agency, the Standards, Productivity and Innovation Board (‘SPRING’) was created 
and given new investigatory powers12 so that it could bring timely injunction 
applications to deal with unfair trade practices and monitor compliance.13 The 
investigatory powers were reinforced with criminal sanctions against persons 
obstructing investigations,14 although unfair practices do not attract criminal 
sanctions. At the same time, court powers were enhanced to allow: (i) injunctive relief 
against, not just the errant trader’s business entity,15 but also complicit individuals;16 
and (ii) additional orders to compel traders17 and complicit individuals18 under 
injunction to notify potential customers of their status (the former in a targeted way 
and the latter in a general way), and to prevent evasion of compliance.19 The 
substantive remedy that was introduced enables consumers to cancel contracts with 
errant traders under injunction who fail to notify the consumers of their status.20  
 
Despite the 2016 revisions, the Singapore consumer protection regime remains 
inadequate. In this paper, the shortcomings of the new regime are discussed in 
comparison with the Australian and Hong Kong regimes, as the Singapore MTI 
specifically considered these regimes when developing the 2016 revisions.21 The 
discussion is organised as follows: Part II sets out background information on 
Singapore’s consumer protection regime. Part III explores SPRING’s new 
investigatory powers. While SPRING’s new investigatory powers provide deterrence, 
in their current form they are overbroad, lack sufficient balance and clarity, and fail to 
                                                 
4  See, eg, above nn 1–2. See also Rachel Au-Yong, ‘Sick of Scams: But what is the Cure?’ The Straits Times (Singapore) 
15 November 2014 <http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/sick-scams-what-cure>. 
5  See Foo, above n 1.  
6  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 69 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). 
7  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Amendment) Act 2016 (Singapore, Act 25 of 2016). 
8  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading Act) (Singapore, cap 52A, 2009 rev ed). 
9  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Amendment) Act 2016 (Commencement) Notification 2016 (Singapore, No S 
624/2016). 
10  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 103 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). 
11  Ibid. 
12  2016 CP(FT)A Part IIIA.  
13  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 70 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). 
14  2016 CP(FT)A Part IIIB.  
15  Ibid ss 2(1), 9(1).  
16  Ibid ss 2(1), 10(1).  
17  Ibid ss 9(1)(c), 9(4)(a)–(c). 
18  Ibid s 10(6)(a). 
19  Ibid ss 9(4)(d)–(f) (traders), 10(6)(c)(complicit individuals). 
20  Ibid ss 9(4)(b), 9(12). 
21  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 69 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). 
  
 
provide consumers and traders with guidance as to when and how SPRING’s 
investigatory powers will be used. It further argues that levying criminal sanctions for 
obstruction of investigation into non-criminal practices appears disproportionate. Part 
IV explains the courts’ enhanced powers. This section first argues that despite the 
enhancements, deterrence of recalcitrant traders will still be problematic without 
criminalising unfair practices. This issue is exacerbated by the new orders requiring 
traders to notify potential customers of their injunction status, which might encourage 
traders to not comply with sanctions. Second, it is argued that the revisions are neither 
comprehensive nor transparent because there are no guidelines to assure traders and 
consumers as to how the enhanced powers will be implemented. Additionally, the 
measures do not encourage reform of errant traders. Part V argues that consumer 
remedies remain insufficient since the new remedy benefits a limited group and still 
requires consumers to initiate action. Part VI then offers recommendations for how to 
achieve a more robust and comprehensive consumer protection regime for Singapore 
based on the Australian and Hong Kong approaches. 
 
II    Background 
 
It is useful to briefly set out the Singaporean framework on contractual fairness and 
the definition of ‘unfair practice’ in the CP(FT)A. Prior to the enactment of the first 
CP(FT)A, there was no legislation targeted at protecting small consumers against 
unfair trade practices generally. Statutory protection was only available in specific 
situations coming within, for example, the Hire-Purchase Act,22 the Pawnbrokers 
Act23 or the Moneylenders Act.24 Regulation of general contractual fairness, whether 
for consumers or businesses, rested on the common law of contract, particularly the 
doctrines of misrepresentation, duress and undue influence, and legislation such as the 
Sale of Goods Act,25 Unfair Contract Terms Act26 and section 3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act.27 The CP(FT)A thus filled a lacuna in the law when it was 
introduced in 2004.28  
 
The 2016 CP(FT)A retains the same basic definition of an unfair practice as in 
previous versions, although its scope has been widened. The 2016 CP(FT)A, under 
section 4, defined the following as unfair practices by a trader in relation to a 
consumer transaction: 
(a) to do or say anything, or omit to do or say anything, if as a result, a consumer might reasonably be 
deceived or misled; 
(b) to make a false claim; 
(c) to take advantage of a consumer if the supplier knows or ought reasonably to know that the consumer  
– 
(i)  is not in a position to protect his own interests; or  
(ii) is not reasonably able to understand the character, nature, language or effect of the transaction or 
any matter related [thereto]. 
 
                                                 
22  (Singapore, cap 125, 2014 rev ed). 
23  (Singapore, cap 222, 1994 rev ed); repealed and re-enacted in 2015 (Singapore, No 2 of 2015). 
24  (Singapore, cap 188, 2010 rev ed). 
25  (Singapore, cap 393, 1999 rev ed). 
26  (Singapore, cap 396, 1994 rev ed). 
27  (Singapore, cap 390, 1994 rev ed). See Wee Ling Loo and Erin Goh-Low Soen Yin, ‘Awards of Damages under the 
Singapore Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act’ (2007) 9:1 Australian Journal of Asian Law 66, 67 n 5 therein and 
accompanying text; Sandra Booysen, ‘Twenty Years (And More) of Controlling Unfair Contract Terms in Singapore’ 
[2016] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 219, 219–20. 
28  See generally Ravi Chandran, ‘Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act’ (July 2004) Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 192, for a commentary on the workings and implications of the first CP(FT)A. 
  
 
Section 4(d) further refers to a list of twenty-eight specific unfair practices in the 
Second Schedule, nine of which have been added by a 2016 amendment.29 
 
To deter unfair practices, the previous CP(FT)A provisions targeted the errant traders’ 
desire to avoid bad publicity and the associated loss of reputation and business. 
Potential public naming and shaming was the main tool of deterrence. The 2016 
introduction of investigatory powers and enhancements to court powers essentially 
aim to strengthen this mode of deterrence.  
 
III    Investigatory Powers 
A   New Powers Under the 2016 CP(FT)A 
 
Under the previous and current legislation, both CASE and the Singapore Tourism 
Board (‘STB’) are the first points of contact for consumer complaints regarding unfair 
trade practices.30 However, under the previous CP(FT)A, neither CASE nor STB had 
the power to investigate complaints. They even faced ‘operational difficulties in 
gathering evidence to submit their applications to the Courts to file an injunction.’31 
Now, under the 2016 regime, SPRING has been granted powers to investigate and 
gather evidence regarding alleged unfair practices, with a view to filing injunction 
applications.32 Criminal penalties may be imposed for obstruction of investigation,33 
although unfair practices remain uncriminalised.  
 
CASE and STB may raise cases of errant traders to SPRING for further 
investigation.34 SPRING may conduct an investigation if there are ‘reasonable 
grounds’ for suspecting that an errant trader has, is or is likely to engage in an unfair 
practice or that a person is or has knowingly aided, permitted or procured an errant 
trader to engage in an unfair practice.35 SPRING’s new powers of investigation are 
each considered in turn.   
 
1    Examination of Persons; Production of Information 
SPRING may orally examine any person who appears to be acquainted with relevant 
facts or circumstances of a case.36 Further, SPRING also has the power to issue a 
written notice requiring such person ‘to attend before the investigation officer.’37 
SPRING can also require production of relevant documents or information, from an 
errant trader or any complicit person.38 No person is excused from making a 
disclosure under the 2016 CP(FT)A on the grounds of potential self-incrimination.39  
                                                 
29  Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Amendment) Act 2016 (Singapore, Act 25 of 2016) s 10. 
30  See Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 69 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon); see 
also below n 117 and accompanying text regarding the process for initiating consumer complaints.  
31  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 68 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon).  
32  Ibid 69. This supersedes the previous practice where CASE or STB would be the bodies applying for injunctions: see 
previous CP(FT)A, s 9(1) and the discussion in Part IV on the previous approach. 
33  See discussion at Part IIIA3 below. 
34  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 69 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). It was not 
stated whether SPRING would institute investigations on its own accord, but there is nothing in the legislation to 
prevent this. 
35  2016 CP(FT)A s 12G(1).  
36  Ibid s 12M(1)(a). 
37  Ibid s 12M(1)(b). 
38  Ibid s 12H(1).   
39  Ibid s 12N(1). However, such disclosure is not admissible in evidence against that person in criminal proceedings that 
are not under the 2016 CP(FT)A, although it remains admissible in civil proceedings (including those under the 2016 
CP(FT)A). See 2016 CP(FT)A s 12N(2). Criminal proceedings not under the 2016 CP(FT)A could involve Penal Code 
  
 
 
2    Entry and search 
SPRING may investigate suspect premises with or without a warrant.40 To search 
without warrant, SPRING must give two days’ written notice to the occupier of 
premises reasonably suspected of being used by a person under investigation.41 Such 
notice is not required if the investigation officer has taken all ‘reasonably practicable 
[steps] to give notice but has not been able to do so’.42 During such entry, the officer 
may, for instance: search the premises; take photographs; seize and detain goods; and 
require production of relevant documents.43 SPRING can seek a search warrant after a 
search without a warrant has occurred but failed or was incomplete, or the 
investigation officer believes a search without a warrant would be unproductive.44 
With a warrant, the officer may, in addition to the powers under a search without a 
warrant: search anyone on the premises if there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that he or she possesses relevant documents or goods; take relevant documents; and 
remove relevant equipment.45 
 
3    Criminal Penalties for Obstruction of Investigation 
Criminal penalties may be imposed for obstruction of a SPRING investigation. 
Obstructing a SPRING investigation includes: non-compliance with requirements 
imposed under the abovementioned sections;46 destroying or falsifying documents;47 
providing false or misleading information;48 and obstructing SPRING in the discharge 
of its duties or exercise of its powers, without reasonable excuse.49 Where an offence 
is committed by a corporation but an officer or individual in a management position 
consented to (or knew or should have known of the offence but failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent it), the officer or individual will be deemed guilty of the 
offence and punished.50 Penalties for obstruction of an investigation are fines and/or 
imprisonment.51 Finally, for errant traders or complicit individuals under injunction, 
SPRING will monitor compliance and take action for non-compliance.52 
 
 
B   Evaluation 
 
In the context of consumer protection, the effectiveness of these changes depend on 
their deterrent effect, and whether they provide transparency and clarity to both 
consumers and traders. While these new measures do provide some deterrent effect, 
                                                 
(Singapore, cap 224, 2008 rev ed) violations. Civil proceedings under the CP(FT)A could include SPRING’s injunction 
applications or consumer claims for compensation. 
40  2016 CP(FT)A ss 12I, 12J. 
41  Ibid s 12I(1)–(2).  
42  Ibid s 12I(3).  
43  Ibid s 12I(5).  
44  Ibid s 12J(2). 
45  Ibid s 12J(3).  
46  Ibid s 12O(1), being failure to comply with ss 12H, 12I, 12J, 12L or 12M. These have each been discussed with the 
exception of s 12L, which merely states the investigation officer’s power to require evidence as to a trader’s or complicit 
person’s identity.  
47  2016 CP(FT)A s 12P. 
48  Ibid s 12Q. 
49  Ibid s 12R. 
50  Ibid s 12T. Section 12U provides similar clauses for other forms of organisations such as partnerships and 
unincorporated associations. 
51  Ibid Part IIIB.  
52  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 70 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). 
  
 
there is some question as to the transparency and balance of these new measures, 
especially in comparison with the Hong Kong and Australian approaches.  
 
1    Deterrence (Ease of Investigation) 
There is certainly a deterrent effect in SPRING’s new powers, especially when 
compared to the absence of investigatory powers in the previous regime. SPRING can 
now conduct searches of premises (with or without warrant), examine people and 
require documents, merely on ‘reasonable grounds’ for suspecting that an errant trader 
has, is or is likely to engage in an unfair practice or that a person is or has knowingly 
aided, permitted or procured an errant trader to engage in an unfair practice.53 As 
stated above, criminal penalties can also be imposed for obstructing investigations.54 
SPRING’s investigations can also be carried out by auxiliary police officers as well as 
officers of SPRING,55 giving such investigations the appearance of a criminal or 
quasi-criminal investigation. 
 
These investigatory powers go some way towards countering previous claims of 
CASE’s ‘lack of teeth’ in investigating claims against alleged errant traders.56 
Additionally, SPRING’s broad new powers also facilitate ease of investigation by the 
authorities, which in turn strengthens the deterrent force of the new regime. Indeed, 
some of the broad investigatory powers afforded SPRING have, with some 
justification, been called ‘rather draconian’.57 For instance, the ability to enter 
premises and seize evidence without warrant, with merely a requirement of reasonable 
suspicion of the premises being used by a person under investigation, will result in 
more efficient evidence gathering in pursuit of injunctions against errant traders.58 
Moreover, the possibility of SPRING making heavy demands for information and 
documents during an investigation could potentially impose significant costs on 
traders, and thereby deter them from engaging in unfair practices. In this regard, MTI 
has indicated that only egregious cases would be investigated,59 where arguably, the 
egregious traders might try (even more so than the ordinary trader) to hide relevant 
information, thus justifying a broad-based and efficient entry and search process.  
 
There were some concerns raised in Parliament regarding the use of auxiliary police 
and SPRING’s investigatory officers, rather than actual police, for investigations, 
especially given that ‘some of these errant retailers can be gangsters’.60 However, the 
Minister of State responded that the use of auxiliary police officers to conduct 
investigations was ‘not unique to the CP(FT)A,’61 and provided further assurances 
that SPRING would put in place ‘robust procedures for carrying out investigations’ 
and that SPRING’s officers and the appointed auxiliary police would be ‘sufficiently 
trained’.62 In summary, SPRING’s new investigatory powers will likely have a 
                                                 
53  2016 CP(FT)A s 12G(1). It is not stated whether SPRING will institute investigations on its own accord, but there is 
nothing in the legislation preventing this. 
54  Ibid Part IIIB. 
55  Ibid s 12G(2). Such auxiliary police officers are appointed pursuant to Part IX of the Police Force Act (Singapore, cap 
235, 2006 rev ed). See 2016 CP(FT)A s 12G(5). 
56  See, eg, ‘Consumers Welcome Proposed Changes to Law against Errant Retailers' Today (online), 18 May 2016 
<http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/consumers-welcome-proposed-changes-law-against-errant-retailers>. 
57  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 75 (Dennis Tan Lip Fong). The phrase was used in 
relation to SPRING’s powers ‘to enter take photographs, seize or detain without a court warrant’. 
58  See Part IV below for further discussion on injunctions. 
59  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 100, 104 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). 
60  Ibid 87 (Er Dr Lee Bee Wah). 
61  Ibid 103–4 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). For instance, the Weights and Measures Act (Singapore, cap 349, 
1987 rev ed) (‘WMA’) s 30 also authorizes SPRING inspectors, as well as police officers, to conduct investigations 
under the act.  
62  Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 103-4 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon). 
  
 
measure of deterrence, and go some way towards protecting consumers from 
egregious traders.  
 
2    Lack of Balance and Clarity 
While SPRING’s powers of investigation will have deterrent effect, it is questionable 
whether the powers, as written, provide sufficient balance and clarity, such that 
consumers and traders (whether honest or otherwise) are given assurance and 
guidance as to when and how SPRING will use its investigatory powers. 
 
(a)     Discrepancy — Powers of Entry and Search 
There appears to be a discrepancy between SPRING’s powers with regard to the entry 
and search of premises as written, and what has been indicated will occur in practice. 
It was suggested in Parliament that entry without warrant would not be the ‘default’ 
approach. The Minister of State for MTI stated that while searches without warrant 
could be used where ‘the egregious behaviour require[d] more urgent action’, for 
example, where a large number of tourists might be ‘fleeced’ or ‘multiple feedback 
[was received] from consumers about ... [a trader’s] egregious behaviour’, he 
reiterated that this was not the ‘default position’.63  
 
However, the interpretation that a search without warrant will only be conducted 
under special circumstances does not accord with the language of s 12I, which 
provides for searches without warrant. Indeed, s 12J specifically contemplates that a 
search with warrant would take place only after a search without warrant has 
occurred.64 This is evident from the grounds for obtaining a search warrant, namely: 
 if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that documents had not been produced 
pursuant to a search under s 12I;  
 if documents or goods may be damaged or otherwise affected if prior notice under s 12I 
was provided; or  
 an attempt was made to enter the premises without warrant but such attempt was 
unsuccessful, and there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there are on the 
premises documents or goods that could have been obtained under the provisions relating 
to entry without a warrant.65 
 
In any case, the abovementioned scenarios raised in Parliament66 do not suggest the 
conclusion provided. In the scenario concerning tourists, if the trader has indeed been 
acting that badly, it is more than likely that the trader has committed such acts before, 
and would already be on the government agencies’ radar. In such a case, it should not 
make a significant difference if SPRING were to wait for a court warrant. If the fear is 
that evidence would be destroyed during the delay, there is in any case a two-day 
notice requirement under s 12J.67 If the concern is that the tourists will leave before an 
investigation can take place — information and evidence can always be taken from 
the tourists first, and then SPRING and/or STB could follow up with them after they 
have left Singapore.68 In the scenario concerning traders who have had multiple 
complaints filed against them: if abundant evidence already exists, a wait for a court 
warrant should not make a significant difference. Finally, if the intention is that entry 
                                                 
63  Ibid 104.  
64  2016 CP(FT)A s 12J(2). 
65  Ibid.  
66  See above n 63 and accompanying text discussing the two scenarios where a trader’s egregious behaviour might require 
more urgent action.  
67  2016 CP(FT)A s 12I(1)-(2). There is no notice period if s 12I(3) is invoked. See above n 41 and accompanying text. 
68  See below n 117–118 and accompanying text, explaining how STB, together with CASE, may assist tourists who file 
complaints. 
  
 
and search with warrant (rather than without warrant) is the ‘default’ option, then the 
2016 CP(FT)A should be amended accordingly to avoid any confusion.69 
Alternatively, MTI should issue guidelines specifying that entry and searches with 
warrants will be conducted first. Otherwise, as written, SPRING will be empowered 
to, and may in practice, carry out warrantless searches as its first option.  
 
(b)    Criminal Penalties for Obstruction without Criminal Penalties for Unfair 
Practices 
The imposition of criminal sanctions for obstruction of an investigation into practices 
that (even if proven) are not considered criminal acts seems disproportionate. There is 
a disconnect between the consequences for obstruction of investigation of the 
underlying unfair practices, and the consequences for actually committing the 
underlying unfair practices. Further, the 2016 approach is inconsistent with the 
approach taken under the other two acts SPRING administers: the Consumer 
Protection (Trade Descriptions and Safety Requirements) Act70 (‘CP(TDSR)A’) and 
the Weights and Measures Act (‘WMA’).71 SPRING similarly has investigatory 
powers under both acts,72 and each act provides criminal penalties for obstruction of 
investigations.73 However, unlike the 2016 CP(FT)A, the commission of the 
underlying unlawful actions are in fact considered offences. Under the CP(TDSR)A, 
the provision of false trade descriptions is an offence,74 punishable with fines and/or 
imprisonment.75 Under the WMA, various acts regarding the unlawful use of weights 
and measures are offences,76 also punishable with fines and/or imprisonment.77  
 
(c)     Lack of Calibration 
SPRING’s investigatory powers, while providing deterrence, lack calibration. The 
breadth of the powers could be a potential source of alarm for traders who might be 
innocent or merely careless or negligent in their interactions with consumers. These 
powers also seem to indicate a disregard for the due process rights of traders and 
individuals under investigation. To ameliorate those concerns, Singapore could 
consider adopting aspects of the other two regimes that provide some protections for 
traders and other persons under investigation, without jeopardizing the deterrent effect 
of SPRING’s powers or ability to conduct effective investigations.  
 
(i)    Singapore in Comparison: The Australian and Hong Kong Examples 
Singapore’s approach to investigations is similar to Hong Kong’s, in that both are 
fairly draconian in nature. For instance, in both jurisdictions, an investigation officer 
only needs ‘reasonable’ grounds for suspecting that an unfair practice has been 
committed, before conducting an investigation,78 including a search of premises, and 
                                                 
69  See also the Singapore High Court’s position on statutory interpretation: ‘The words of a Minister must not be 
substituted for the text of the law’ even if ‘through oversight or inadvertence the clear intention of the Parliament fails 
to be translated into the text of the law. However unfortunate it may be when that happens ... [t]he function of the Court 
is to give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in the law.’ Seow Wei Sin v PP [2011] 1 SLR 1199, [21] (emphasis 
in original). 
70  (Singapore, cap 53, 2013 rev ed). 
71  WMA (Singapore, cap 349, 1987 rev ed).  
72  CP(TDSR)A s 23; WMA s 30. 
73  CP(TDSR)A s 24; WMA ss 32, 35. 
74  CP(TDSR)A s 4. 
75  Ibid s 15.  
76  See, eg, WMA ss 6–7, 10–12, 14, 19. 
77  Ibid s 35.  
78  2016 CP(FT)A s 12G(1); Trade Descriptions Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 362 (‘HK Ordinance’) s 15. The Hong Kong 
Customs and Excise Department has primary responsibility for enforcing the HK Ordinance: Enforcement Guidelines 
for the Trade Descriptions (Unfair Trade Practices) (Amendment) Ordinance 2012 (July 2013) Part A[1] 
<http://www.coms-auth.hk/filemanager/en/content_800/enforcement_ guidelines_en.pdf> (‘HK Guidelines’).  
  
 
request for information and/or documents.79 Criminal penalties are also imposed for 
obstruction of investigation.80 Indeed, Hong Kong arguably goes further than 
Singapore, in that the investigation officer may ‘arrest or detain for further enquiries 
without warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed any 
offence’ under the HK Ordinance.81 However, Hong Kong makes a concession to the 
rights of individuals under investigation — a magistrate’s warrant or authorisation 
from the Commissioner of Customs and Excise is required for entry and search of 
domestic premises.82  
 
In comparison, Australia’s approach is far less draconian and more calibrated. In 
particular, Australia provides significantly more rights for individuals under 
investigation. For instance, while entry into suspect premises without warrant is also 
allowed if the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) has 
‘reasonable grounds’ for suspecting that there may be ‘evidential material’ on the 
premises, the occupier must first have given consent for such entry and search.83 
Consent is also required for removal of evidential material from the premises.84 
Additionally, the investigation officer must also inform the occupier that consent may 
be refused.85 Penalties are only incurred for non-cooperation with searches with 
warrants.86 Even in the case of searches with a warrant, there are protections in place 
for occupiers.87 Before entry for such a search, the officer must announce his or her 
authority to enter, and give the occupier opportunity to allow entry.88 While the 
investigation officer’s powers of search with warrant are similar to that during a 
search without warrant,89 a key difference is that the occupier may observe the 
search,90 a right that is not provided in Singapore or Hong Kong.  
 
Similarly, Australian investigators can also summon individuals or companies to 
provide relevant documents or evidence concerning a possible breach of the ACCA 
pursuant to s 155 of the ACCA (‘s 155 notice’).91 Unlike Singapore or Hong Kong, 
the ACCC has published a number of guidelines regarding how examinations 
pursuant to a s 155 notice will be conducted.92 For instance, the examinee will 
generally be permitted the assistance of a legal adviser as ‘a matter of procedural 
fairness.’93 The ACCC shall also not conduct a ‘fishing expedition’ for information.94 
Information gathered will only be used to assist the ACCC in its investigations into a 
potential breach.95 The ACCC is also required to consider the burdens imposed by the 
issuance of a s 155 notice, including the time and cost implications.96  
                                                 
79  2016 CP(FT)A ss 12H(1), 12I, 12J(1), 12(M)(1); HK Ordinance s 15. 
80  2016 CP(FT)A Part III; HK Ordinance ss 17–18.   
81  HK Ordinance s 16B(1). 
82  Ibid s 16. 
83  Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘ACCA’) s 154D. 
84  Ibid s 154E(1)(d). 
85  Ibid s 154D(3). 
86  Ibid s154Q, 154R, 154RA; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (‘Crimes Act’) s 4AA. 
87  ACCA s 154X–Z.  
88  Ibid s 154M(1). 
89  Ibid s 154G(1)–(1A).  
90  Ibid s 154P. 
91  Ibid s 155(1). 
92  Commonwealth of Australia, ACCC Guidelines - Use of Section 155 powers (July 2017) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/accc-guidelines-use-of-s-155-powers> (‘S155 Guidelines’); Commonwealth 
of Australia, The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s accountability framework for investigations 
(22 May 2013) <https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/the-acccs-accountability-framework-for-investigations> 
(‘Accountability Framework’). 
93  S155 Guidelines, above n 92, 8. 
94  Ibid 3. 
95  Ibid 10. 
96  Ibid 3. See also Accountability Framework, above n 92, 28.  
  
 
 
Even with these protective guidelines, Australia’s Competition Policy Review 
(‘Harper Review’) found that complying with s 155 requests imposed a significant 
burden, because of ‘the increased use of technology leading to more electronic 
material being retained by businesses that may need to be searched in order to comply 
with a notice.’97 The Harper Review recommended that notices be framed ‘in the 
narrowest form possible’ and that the recipient should only be required to undertake 
‘a reasonable search, taking into account factors such as the number of documents 
involved and the ease and cost of retrieving the documents [requested].’98 It also 
recommended including a defence to the charge of refusal or failure to comply with a 
s 155 notice, that the recipient could demonstrate that such a ‘reasonable search’ was 
undertaken.99 The Australian government accepted this recommendation and intends 
to review its guidelines on s 155 notices ‘having regard to the increasing burden 
imposed by notices in the digital age.’100 Indeed, it appears that some of these 
recommendations were incorporated in the recently issued S155 Guidelines.101 
 
(ii)    Lessons From Australia 
In the interests of providing transparency and balance, SPRING could similarly 
provide certain basic protections for individuals under investigation. A key protection 
in the case of a search without warrant would be procuring the occupier’s consent for 
the entry and search of premises. A search of one’s premises (whether domestic or 
business) would presumably be invasive and a significant burden for the occupier. 
Requiring the occupier’s consent for such search, as Australia does, recognises that 
burden and is also an acknowledgment of the occupier’s rights in his or her own 
property. While there is a concern that such consent might be denied and/or evidence 
destroyed due to the denial of such a request, there is already a two-day notice 
requirement for a warrantless search, which would have allowed the occupier the 
opportunity to destroy or hide evidence in any event.102 Given that MTI has asserted 
that a search with warrant would be the default option for SPRING’s investigators,103 
requesting the occupier’s consent for a search without warrant should not unduly 
affect SPRING’s investigations. Seeking consent may be a polite fiction, since 
SPRING can always request a warrant for a search, but it nevertheless assures 
individuals under investigation, or who could potentially come under investigation, 
that they do have some basic rights under the new regime.  
 
In this vein, SPRING could also consider adopting the Harper Review’s 
recommendations, that is, to frame requests for information in the narrowest form 
possible, while allowing for a defence that a reasonable search was undertaken to 
comply with the notice.104 With regard to oral examinations, SPRING could follow 
the Australian guidelines105 and consider allowing an examinee the assistance of a 
                                                 
97  Commonwealth of Australia, Competition Policy Review Final Report 2015 (March 2015) (‘Harper Review’) Part 2 
[3.15]. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Ibid.  
100  Commonwealth of Australia, Government Response to the Competition Policy Review (24 November 2015), 32 
<https://treasury.gov.au/publication/government-response-to-the-competition-policy-review/>. 
101  S155 Guidelines, above n 92, 3–5. The guidelines do not currently address the proposed ‘reasonable search’ defence 
to a failure or refusal to comply with a s 155 notice, see S155 Guidelines, 1. 
102  See above n 41 and accompanying text.  
103  See discussion under ‘IIIB2(a) Discrepancy — Powers of Entry and Search’ above. 
104  While it is already a defence to a charge of failure to provide documents/information pursuant to SPRING’s 
investigations that said document was not in the person’s possession or control and it ‘was not reasonably 
practicable’ to produce such document, or the person had ‘a reasonable excuse’ for failing to provide relevant 
information (2016 CP(FT)A ss 12O(2)–(3)), there is no explanation of the standards for such ‘reasonableness’. 
105  S155 Guidelines, above n 92; Accountability Framework, above n 92. 
  
 
legal adviser, especially since statements provided during such an examination may 
be used against the examinee in civil proceedings.106 SPRING could also provide 
information as to what will occur during the examination, for example, the likely 
length of an examination, the typical questions asked, and what will occur post-
examination. SPRING could also clarify that the evidence gathered will only be used 
for that particular investigation.  
 
Indeed, SPRING could consider providing guidelines on its overall approach to 
investigations. Both Hong Kong and Australia have published guidelines discussing 
the circumstances under which the relevant authorities will conduct investigations of 
consumer complaints. The HK Guidelines state that only egregious traders will be 
investigated, to ‘maximise the effectiveness of enforcement actions’ and ‘protect the 
interests of consumers and honest traders.’107 Priority will be accorded to cases 
involving, for example, conduct that is ‘repeated, intentional ... or constitutes a serious 
contravention’; ‘suggests a pattern of non-compliance’ or indicates a ‘risk of future 
misconduct’; and for which enforcement may bring about ‘worthwhile educative or 
deterrent effect’.108 Australia also gives priority to matters that demonstrate (among 
others) conduct: resulting in significant consumer detriment; affecting disadvantaged 
or vulnerable consumer groups; that is industry-wide or likely to become widespread 
if there is no intervention by the ACCC; and action is likely to have a ‘worthwhile 
educative or deterrent effect’.109  
 
Similarly, SPRING could publish guidelines to address when the full brunt of its 
investigatory powers would be brought to bear. They could include assurances that: a 
search with warrant will be SPRING’s default approach;110 that due regard will be 
given to the rights of occupiers in their premises, in particular that the occupier’s 
consent will be required for searches without warrants; that requests for information 
and evidence will be made with due regard for the burden imposed by such requests; 
that protections will be available for individuals going through examinations; and that 
only egregious cases will be pursued.  
 
Publication of these guidelines would be unlikely to reduce the deterrent effect of 
SPRING’s powers, as they will not be binding on SPRING. In fact, the published 
guidelines could specify, as Hong Kong does, that they are non-binding.111 Such 
guidelines would also provide some assurance to traders that innocent mistakes or 
minor errors are unlikely to be pursued vigorously. While it could be argued that 
innocent traders should in any case have little concern about being investigated, there 
is always the concern that they may have ‘inadvertently flouted the rules or engaged 
in unfair practice[s].’112 At the same time, the guidelines will indicate to consumers 
that egregious traders — the ones that pose the most concern to consumers — will be 
investigated and hopefully penalised.  
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Australia’s experience indicates that providing protections for persons under 
investigations, as well as publishing guidelines as to its investigatory procedures, 
should not significantly affect the authorities’ ability to effectively investigate and 
pursue consumer complaints. In 2015 and 2016, for instance, the ACCC had a target 
of 80 in-depth investigations of alleged violations of the Australian Consumer Law,113 
but ended up conducting 126 investigations.114 In any event, even with the publication 
of the above guidelines, Singapore’s regime still contains significant protections to 
ensure the effectiveness of its investigations and the cooperation of parties under 
investigation.115 In conclusion, while SPRING’s new powers of investigation 
certainly do provide a deterrent effect, they also indicate a lack of balance and clarity, 
which may cause concern amongst honest traders.  
 
IV    Court Powers 
A   Previous Approach 
 
Before any court powers are invoked, a specified body116 — either CASE or STB — 
upon receiving a complaint about an unfair trade practice from a consumer (or 
tourist), could negotiate on behalf of the complainant and/or mediate the dispute.117 
Since CASE is the dedicated consumer organisation with the relevant expertise and 
resources, STB has appointed CASE to ‘co-administer consumer-related complaints 
by tourists’ from 2011.118 For brevity, references will only be made to CASE as the 
specified body in this section. 
 
CASE also has powers under the previous CP(FT)A, to invite the errant trader to enter 
into a VCA where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a trader had 
engaged, was engaging or was likely to engage in an unfair practice.119 CASE could 
not compel a trader to enter into the VCA. However, a trader refused at the risk of 
CASE applying to court to have its act declared an unfair practice and have an 
injunction issued to restrain it from such acts. Where the Court granted such orders, a 
trader could also be required to publicise the declaration and injunction to the 
public.120 Notably, CASE could only proceed after obtaining the Injunction Proposals 
Review Panel’s (‘IPRP’) endorsement of its proposed application.121  
 
If the trader agreed, the VCA must include the trader’s undertaking to cease the unfair 
practice.122 It might also include any or all of the following trader’s undertakings: 
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 to reimburse CASE for costs and expense incurred; 
 to compensate the loss or damage of any consumer; and 
 to publicise the VCA in the manner required.123 
The undertaking to compensate a consumer would only be included at the aggrieved 
consumer’s request. Once included, it could not be varied without the consumer’s 
consent.124 The trader’s undertakings could not be varied without the trader’s 
consent.125 If the trader breached the VCA, civil claims could be initiated by: (i) the 
consumer for payment of the promised compensation;126 and (ii) CASE for the 
promised reimbursement127 and/or further expenses incurred in publicising the 
VCA.128 For committing further unfair practices, CASE could also, after obtaining the 
IPRP’s endorsement, apply to court for an injunction.  
 
The VCA is the least costly method of resolution for all parties involved, including an 
errant trader,129 because the VCA need not incorporate a trader’s undertaking to 
publicise. CASE would likely not insist on such inclusion, to encourage the trader to 
enter into the VCA. However, were there sufficient incentives to make entry into the 
VCA and compliance with its terms the more attractive option to an errant trader 
compared to the alternatives? Before the 2016 amendments, the strongest incentive 
was the ‘spectre’ of an injunction ordered against it — the trader could be fined 
and/or imprisoned should it breach the court order, and be found in contempt of 
court.130 This was in addition to the naming and shaming that would follow if the 
Court also ordered the trader to publicise the injunction. Potential civil claims by 
aggrieved consumers were poor incentives since consumers may be reluctant to 
expend cost, time and effort in pursuing legal action or refrain because of 
unfamiliarity with the legal process.131 Unfortunately, the regime prescribed a 
circuitous route towards obtaining the court orders, which prevented expeditious 
action.132 For example, in 2014, in relation to a particular trader, CASE estimated that 
several months would be required to ‘seek the necessary approval from our relevant 
committees as well as the [IPRP] … and then apply to the Court for the injunction’.133  
 
In any event, the effectiveness of the injunction134 (and even the VCA) had been 
called into question as it (they) had been found to be easily circumvented. During the 
Parliamentary debates on the 2016 amendment, Mr Lim Biow Chuan, the President of 
CASE, stated:  
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Out of the six injunctions taken out by CASE [since the CP(FT)A was introduced in 2004],135 
every one of them had ceased operations after the injunction. Some retailers who have signed 
VCAs had used the names of their relatives to set up another company to operate a new 
business, and this defeats the intent of the VCAs and the court injunctions as any restrictions 
imposed can easily be overcome.136 
 
B   New Approach 
 
Under the new approach, the previous CP(FT)A provisions relating to VCAs are 
unchanged. As mentioned, CASE and STB ‘remain the first points of contact for 
locals and tourists’ to provide assistance in consumer disputes through negotiation, 
mediation and VCAs,137 and a new administering body, SPRING, is appointed with 
powers of investigation and enforcement, to which CASE or STB may now refer 
cases for investigation.138 CASE and STB would no longer initiate injunction 
applications139 and the IPRP is abolished.140 Instead, after completing its 
investigation,141 SPRING could apply to court for an injunction against not just the 
errant trader142 but also complicit parties, that is, those who have knowingly abetted, 
aided, permitted or procured the trader to engage in the unfair practice.143 SPRING 
would subsequently ensure compliance with the resulting court orders.144 Though not 
explicitly provided in the amendments, SPRING would work together with CASE or 
STB to publish notices of any or all of the following actions or court orders against 
the trader and/or complicit individual:  
 commencement of the injunction application; 
 grant of an interim injunction; 
 grant of an injunction and/or declaration.145 
The amendments explicitly empower the Court to require the trader and/or complicit 
individual to reimburse SPRING for expenses thus incurred.146  
 
The new regime also allows additional orders to accompany the injunction for more 
targeted naming and shaming of the errant trader, and general naming and shaming of 
the complicit individuals. Vis-a-vis the trader, the Court may order it to do one or 
more of the following:147 
 give written notification of the details of the declaration and injunction to a potential 
customer and obtain a written acknowledgment from him prior to the entry into a consumer 
transaction; and/or 
 include in every invoice or receipt issued to a consumer, a statement that the trader is under 
the declaration and injunction order. 
For non-compliance with the first-mentioned order, but not the second, the 
amendments confer upon the customer a right to cancel the contract entered into.148 
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Vis-a-vis the complicit party, a court may order them to publish to the public, at their 
own expense, the details of the injunction in a manner that secures ‘prompt and 
adequate publicity’.149 To prevent the trader and/or complicit parties from evading 
compliance, a court may require them to notify SPRING in writing of certain events 
that will enable closer monitoring of the parties under injunction, for instance, 
changes to the trader’s business address or the complicit individual’s employment 
status.150 Compliance with the orders to name and shame and to notify SPRING must 
be observed for a specified period of up to five years, at the Court’s discretion.151  
 
C   Evaluation 
 
The 2016 amendments did not incorporate aspects of the Hong Kong and Australian 
approaches that could have made the CP(FT)A a more effective tool of deterrence, 
one that encourages reform of recalcitrant traders, and provides transparency and 
assurance of the Singapore Government’s balanced approach in implementing 
regulation. This section will discuss how the 2016 amendments fare based on the said 
parameters. 
 
1    Deterrence (Encouraging Voluntary Compliance) 
Taken together, the 2016 enhancements to the available injunctive relief could have 
the deterrent effect that MTI intends, that is, to dissuade would-be errant traders and 
persuade the majority of them to enter into VCAs.152 First, imposing injunctions 
against all parties involved in the unfair practice, rather than just the trader, could 
discourage employees from being complicit. It could also discourage friends or 
relatives from aiding the errant business owner to evade the injunction or VCA by 
letting him use their names to start a new business.153 Further, it closes the previous 
loophole where the injunction would be issued against the incorporated trader while 
leaving the individual owner unchecked. The individual owner can now be subjected 
to an injunction as a party who ‘knowingly permitted or procured’ the incorporated 
trader to engage in the unfair practice, and can no longer circumvent the law by 
deregistering the stigmatised incorporated entity and registering a new one to carry on 
the same business.  
 
Second, if strictly complied with, the orders to notify in writing the potential customer 
of the trader’s injunction status at his store (and obtain acknowledgment in writing), 
or in print on receipts or invoices, are effective means to warn the customer of the 
trader’s poor reputation. The trader is likely to appreciate that these orders could 
result in a shut-down of their business. After all, few consumers would, having 
received such warning on the brink of a consumer transaction, likely proceed with the 
transaction. Not least, the notification obligations allow SPRING to monitor parties 
under injunction for compliance more closely, with the result that traders will likely 
take court orders more seriously.  
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But what of the recalcitrant trader? The harshness of the orders to notify potential 
customers at the store, if imposed, could have the unintended effect of incentivising 
the recalcitrant trader to devise ways and means to avoid strict compliance. For 
example, the trader could simply insert a statement on his injunction status (perhaps in 
fine print) in a contract document which customers are required to sign, without 
specifically drawing it to the customer’s attention. Customers who do not read 
documents before signing or who do not read the fine print, whether due to 
unfamiliarity with the language, lack of time or the trader’s other dubious acts, would 
be none the wiser. The same could arguably apply to notifications printed on invoices 
and receipts. 
 
The prospect of such a scenario is likely what prompted the inclusion of a customer’s 
right of cancellation of contracts entered into with a trader who failed to specifically 
notify the customer of his injunction status prior to contracting.154 Curiously, this right 
is not extended where the trader failed to comply with an order to print his injunction 
status on receipts and invoices. Whether the right of cancellation, or the prospect of 
being charged with contempt of court, will reduce the incentive to avoid strict 
compliance for a recalcitrant trader bent on saving his business is doubtful. What is 
evident though, is that considerable time and resources would be required to enforce 
compliance should the scenario materialise,155 apart from diluting the incentive for 
recalcitrant traders to enter into VCAs and abide by their terms. 
 
(a)    Singapore in Comparison: The Australian and Hong Kong Examples 
In contrast, much stronger incentives to encourage genuine traders’ voluntary 
compliance exist under the Hong Kong and Australian regimes. In Hong Kong, 
certain unfair practices are made criminal offences under the HK Ordinance.156 
However, the Hong Kong enforcement agency has the discretion to advise the errant 
trader to consider providing an undertaking.157 If the errant trader accepts, the 
agency’s right to commence or continue with investigations or criminal proceedings 
against the trader in respect of the unfair practice is suspended.158 The voluntary 
undertaking typically requires the trader to admit to having perpetrated particular 
unfair practices, promise not to continue or repeat them, take specific corrective 
action and acknowledge that the enforcement agency may publish the undertaking to 
the public,159 including publication on the agency’s public register.160 Even if 
accepted, the trader would still be required to cooperate with the agency’s inspections 
at its business premises to ensure adherence.161 Despite these requirements, providing 
a voluntary undertaking is still far preferable to the alternative of criminal 
prosecution. 
 
Moreover, the Hong Kong enforcement agency retains the upper hand in obtaining the 
trader’s voluntary compliance. The wording of the Hong Kong provision, compared 
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with Singapore’s, indicates as much. Rather than to ‘invite’162 the trader to provide 
the undertaking, the Hong Kong enforcement agency ‘may accept’163 the undertaking 
proffered, and can only accept it with the consent of the Secretary of Justice.164 In 
sum, the onus is on the trader to convince the enforcement agency to accept its 
undertaking.165 Factors taken into account include the likelihood of compliance by the 
trader and the willingness of the trader to commit to implementing a compliance 
programme for its employees.166 The Hong Kong agency’s acceptance can be 
withdrawn on certain grounds, for example, if the acceptance was wrongfully 
obtained.167 If withdrawn, the suspension on investigations or court proceedings 
would be lifted.168 These include civil proceedings for an injunction against the trader 
(which could be initiated as an alternative to accepting the trader’s undertaking or 
upon a breach of the undertaking)169 or criminal prosecution.170 Thus, although the 
trader is under no compulsion to provide an undertaking,171 there are built-in 
incentives to provide and adhere to it. The trader would have been advised by the 
enforcement agency on all the implications of providing an undertaking or not, the 
possibility of withdrawal of acceptance, and the attendant consequences.172  
 
Australia takes a similar approach, but with some interesting differences. Like Hong 
Kong, certain unfair practices are made criminal offences.173 Unlike Hong Kong, the 
offences do not attract custodial sentences, only significant fines.174 However, the 
Australian Compliance and Enforcement Guide (‘Australian Guidelines’) stresses that 
civil compliance measures will be the preferred tools of deterrence over criminal 
prosecution.175 Unlike Singapore and Hong Kong, civil compliance measures are not 
limited to the trader’s undertaking or an injunction or publicising the same. The ACL 
provides a range of civil compliance measures of increasing severity,176 with the 
trader’s written undertaking being among the least severe. A trader that thinks it has 
committed an unfair practice can offer an undertaking, which the regulator (the 
ACCC)177 may, but is not obliged to accept.178 Once accepted, a breach of any 
undertaking enables the ACCC to apply to a court for orders against the trader, which 
include any or all of the orders to comply; pay any financial benefit gained from the 
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breach to the Commonwealth, State or Territory; or compensate any consumer.179 
Unlike Hong Kong, the ACCC does not require admission of the unfair practice in the 
undertaking, but will reject one where the trader denies liability.180 Similarly to Hong 
Kong, the terms of the undertakings are published in a public register.181 
 
Apart from criminal prosecution, the more severe civil compliance measures also 
provide incentives for the trader to offer an undertaking. For example, the ACCC can 
apply to a court for civil pecuniary penalties182 to be imposed on the errant trader and 
other parties involved in the unfair practice (which only requires proof of 
contravention on the balance of probabilities).183 The ACCC can also apply to a court 
for an order to disqualify a person who has committed, attempted to commit or been 
involved in committing any of the specified unfair practices from managing 
corporations for a period that the court deems fit.184 As such, the Australian approach 
has a greater range of built-in incentives that places the ACCC in a strong position to 
induce voluntary civil compliance and adherence to undertakings given. 
 
2    Transparency and Assurance of Balance 
Since the 2016 amendments came into force, the only guidance published by SPRING 
is a three-page list of Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’).185 Brief explanations on 
the CP(FT)A, its scope, the general definition of ‘unfair practice’ are set out in the 
FAQs. Further, SPRING’s role as the administering agency tasked to gather evidence 
against persistent errant retailers, file timely injunction applications and enforce the 
injunction orders is reiterated. Consumers with complaints are directed to approach 
CASE, STB or the Small Claims Tribunal (‘SCT’) rather than SPRING. Although 
simplicity is not necessarily a bad thing, more guidance and assurance can perhaps be 
given to businesses (honest or dishonest) and consumers alike on the manner of 
implementation of the 2016 CP(FT)A. For example, on the timeliness and 
proportionality in complaints handling and, as mentioned, the manner in which 
powers of investigation will be wielded. 
 
(a)    Singapore Compared: The Australian and Hong Kong Examples 
In this vein, the enforcement guidelines in Hong Kong and Australia provide greater 
transparency and assurance of their respective governments’ resolve in taking a 
calibrated approach towards regulation. For instance, the HK Guidelines clarify that 
‘guiding principles’ underpin enforcement actions. These ‘guiding principles’ include: 
 ‘Targeting’: making the best use of resources to protect the interests of consumers and 
honest traders by setting investigation priorities through a risk-based approach, with 
particular attention paid ‘to repeated [sic] offenders and contraventions that significantly 
undermine consumer interests’;186 
 ‘Proportionality’: ensuring that enforcement action is commensurate with the extent of 
‘consumer detriment and the harm done to the community at large’;187 
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 ‘Consistency’: ensuring ‘consistency … in determining the most appropriate enforcement 
actions to be taken in different cases’;188 and  
 ‘Transparency’: to help traders understand what is expected under the HK Ordinance,189 
the guidelines indicate the general circumstances where any one enforcement action will 
be taken and consequences for non-compliance including specific information on 
undertakings;190 injunctions;191 and prosecutions;192 some of which have been highlighted 
in the foregoing discussion.  
The Australian Guidelines express a commitment to the same principles generally,193 
and additionally, to balancing ‘confidentiality’ of information acquired during 
investigations with the need to inform the public; ensuring ‘timeliness’ in complaints 
handling and enforcement action; ‘accountability’ to the public for enforcement 
activity; and maintaining an ‘awareness’ of national implications of the enforcement 
decisions.194 As mentioned, the Australian Guidelines stress that civil enforcement 
measures can be applied more broadly than criminal prosecution.195 
 
3    Encouraging Reform 
As noted, the orders under the 2016 CP(FT)A for traders to notify potential customers 
at the store of their injunction status are harsh, and could incentivise the trader to 
avoid strict compliance. This would reduce their effectiveness as tools to deter much 
less, encourage reform of a recalcitrant trader. Other options, apart from naming and 
shaming, should be considered to rehabilitate recalcitrant traders. 
 
(a)    Singapore Compared: The Australian and Hong Kong Examples 
In Hong Kong, when the enforcement agency applies for an injunction against the 
trader, the Court is given the discretion to accept the trader’s undertaking not to 
continue or repeat the unfair practice instead of granting the injunction.196 If the 
undertaking is accepted, the Court has the further discretion not to order the trader to 
publicise it.197 This adds another layer to the measures in Hong Kong that serve to 
encourage reform.  
 
In Australia, a court may, on the ACCC’s application, make non-punitive orders that 
require the errant trader to take remedial actions for the benefit of the public or to 
prevent a repeat of the unfair practices by its employees and others involved in its 
business. These include:198 
 performing a community service that counters the particular unfair practice the trader had 
perpetrated, for example, making a trader who falsely advertised to make available a 
training video which explains advertising obligations under the law, or a trader who 
engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct to carry out a community awareness 
programme to alert consumers against such practices; and/or 
 during a specified period (not exceeding 3 years):  
o establish a compliance programme for employees and other person involved in the 
trader’s business; 
o establish an education and training programme for them; or 
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o revise the trader’s internal operations that had led to the unfair practice.  
Having a range of civil compliance measures that begins with the VCA and that 
increase in severity in response the trader’s level of cooperation or contrition, while 
reserving criminal prosecution for the most egregious of traders could help achieve 
meaningful deterrence and reform. Coupling this with guidelines on a calibrated 
approach would signal the Singapore Government’s resolve to better balance the 
interests of consumers and businesses even if they have no binding effect on SPRING. 
In sum, MTI’s 2015 review should have seriously considered some of the highlighted 
Hong Kong and Australian measures so as to provide for a comprehensive regulatory 
approach. 
 
V    Remedies 
 
The 2016 amendments have not done much to improve consumer remedies. Under 
both the previous and 2016 CP(FT)A, the consumer may lodge a complaint with 
CASE or STB, which may invite the errant trader to enter into a VCA that, at the 
consumer’s request, could include the trader’s undertaking to compensate the 
consumer.199 However, if the trader breaches the undertaking, the consumer would 
have to initiate legal action for ‘a civil debt due to the consumer’.200 
 
Alternatively, a consumer could initiate legal action against the trader in the SCT, 
Magistrate or District Court201 directly, without any prior complaint to CASE or STB. 
However, the consumer would still be in a predicament if the trader fails to comply 
with the court order or judgment. As stated in Parliament when Singapore’s first 
consumer protection bill was debated202 and which scenario remains true today: 
If the merchants do not comply with the order of the [SCT] and refuse to compensate the consumers, 
keep on delaying payment or even close down their business, these claimants would have a big 
headache. They will have to apply for a writ of seizure and sale. If the other party has absconded or 
has deliberately closed down its business, the claimants will have to go through more legal 
proceedings to enforce the court order. Otherwise they will just have to resign [themselves] to fate 
and give up their claims. These unscrupulous merchants will just run away scot-free. 
 
Additionally, under both regimes, should an injunction application against the trader 
be made to court while the consumer action for redress is pending, any party, 
including the trader, may apply to have the consumer’s action stayed pending a 
determination of the injunction application.203 The Court could grant a stay if satisfied 
that the determination of the injunction application will be material to the consumer 
action.204 This may not work to the advantage of consumers, such as tourists, whose 
priority is a quick claim for compensation.  
 
As mentioned, the 2016 amendments only introduce one new substantive consumer 
remedy: a right to cancel contracts where the trader under injunction fails to 
specifically notify the consumer and obtain acknowledgment in writing of his 
injunction status prior to contracting.205 The consumer may give notice of cancellation 
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within six months of the date of contracting and render the contract unenforceable.206 
Among others, the consumer obtains a right to a refund of any sum paid within 60 
days of the notice of cancellation207 and may claim against the trader for breach of 
statutory duty for failure to pay.208 However, this remedy is limited to consumers 
dealing with a trader under an injunction and a concomitant order to specifically 
notify.209 Combined with the fact that consumers who cancel contracts still need to 
initiate actions on their own if unpaid, does not make the cancellation of contracts a 
significant remedy. Although a new procedural right to rely on evidence disclosed to 
SPRING during their investigations helps ease consumers’ evidentiary burden in their 
claims for compensation,210 the usefulness of this procedural right depends on 
consumers commencing action in the first place. 
 
A   Singapore in Comparison: The Australian and Hong Kong Examples 
 
In contrast, both Hong Kong and Australia provide greater assistance to the aggrieved 
consumer. In Hong Kong, if a person is convicted of an offence involving certain 
unfair practices, a court may, in addition to passing a sentence, order the person to pay 
‘compensation to any person who has suffered financial loss… [that is] recoverable as 
a civil debt.’211 In Australia, the ACCC may accept undertakings by the errant trader 
and for breach of any undertaking, apply to a court for orders which include a 
requirement to ‘compensate any … person who has suffered loss … as a result of the 
breach’.212 Where the ACCC applies for an injunction, the court may, in granting the 
injunction, also require the trader to ‘refund money; transfer property; or honour a 
promise.’213 The ACCC is also expressly empowered to apply to a court for 
compensation on behalf of victims of unfair practices who have consented in writing 
to their doing so. Whether the ACCC applies for the imposition of civil pecuniary 
penalties214 or criminal proceedings are commenced against the trader,215 the Court 
may order compensation of ‘a person who has suffered loss.’216 Further, a court must 
give preference to ordering compensation over civil pecuniary penalties217 or criminal 
fines218 where the trader does not have sufficient financial resources to pay both.219 In 
anticipation of such monetary relief, fines or penalties, an order to freeze the errant 
trader’s assets may be obtained.220 
 
Singapore could do more for consumers in this respect. Even if it were merely to 
empower courts to order compensation for the aggrieved consumers when issuing an 
injunction against the trader, this would save them the time and cost of having to 
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initiate action on their own.221 If compensation orders are available, a Mareva 
Injunction under the Singapore Rules of Court could be taken out to freeze the 
trader’s assets to prevent the trader dissipating his assets to defeat the order.222 
Consumers would thus be more likely to receive compensation. 
 
VI    Suggestions for Further Reform 
 
In light of the foregoing discussion, further reforms for deterrence, remedies, 
rehabilitating errant traders, and guidelines are suggested in turn. 
  
A   Deterrence 
 
While the 2016 revisions to the CP(FT)A have some deterrent effect, most significantly due to 
SPRING’s new investigatory powers, the truly recalcitrant trader remains a concern. Even the 
prospect of an investigation by SPRING may not be sufficient deterrence. All the trader has to do is 
comply with SPRING’s searches and requests for information, as criminal penalties only come into 
play if an investigation is obstructed. Indeed, a trader may even consider complying with SPRING’s 
investigations as a mere cost of doing business. The idea of criminalising unfair practices therefore 
bears revisiting, especially given the Singapore Government’s stated objective of resolving potential 
or actual unfair practices at the ‘front end of the spectrum’, through measures such as education, 
negotiation, mediation and VCAs.223 
The Singapore Government has consistently eschewed making unfair practices 
criminal offences on the basis that more serious offences related to business dealings 
were already covered by existing legislation,224 and that ‘egregious cases [involving] 
criminal activities’ would be handled by the police.225 Admittedly, existing 
Singaporean law already criminalises serious offences such as cheating, criminal 
intimidation, touting, false labelling and false trade descriptions.226 However, the 
police did not, until recently,227 take serious action against errant traders even when 
the unfair practice amounted to a crime; the police often classified consumer-trader 
disputes as civil rather than criminal in nature.228 Although the trader in the 
Vietnamese tourist case was ultimately prosecuted, it is fair to surmise that it came 
about only because of the bad publicity generated internationally that threatened 
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Singapore’s reputation as a ‘shopper’s paradise’.229 In a number of cases egregious 
traders have been the ones calling the police when any consumer protested against 
their unfair practices.230 Additionally, it is unknown whether any misgivings were 
expressed at the continued refusal to criminalise unfair practices in the public 
consultation feedback to the proposed 2016 CP(FT)A amendments. Because a 
consultation report has not been published,231 consideration of the arguments for and 
against criminalising is therefore apposite.  
 
In a 2005–2006 survey on some OECD countries’ consumer protection regimes, 
certain jurisdictions that have criminalised unfair practices, like Australia and 
Belgium, recognised that criminal investigations and prosecution are time and 
resource intensive (since crimes require proof beyond reasonable doubt), and are not 
practical for ‘rapidly stopping illegal conduct or providing timely consumer 
redress’.232 Yet these countries also acknowledge that criminal law plays a role where 
alternative measures do not provide sufficient deterrence.233 This view is shared by 
academics who identified other possible shortcomings, for example, the enforcement 
agency’s reluctance to initiate criminal proceedings except in the clearest cases and 
the courts’ tendency to view ‘consumer offences as lesser crimes with the result that 
the fines imposed might not be sufficiently heavy and might be treated by traders as a 
cost of business.’234 In Singapore, notwithstanding existing offences under the law, a 
deliberate identification of particular unfair practices as offences could add to the 
deterrent effect by ‘headlining’ the impugned acts. It is important for another reason 
— certain instances of unfair practices may not so clearly amount to an existing 
crime. Examples include bait advertising, hard selling, and circumstances where 
consumers are made to sign agreements containing onerous terms that are not 
explained to them, even when they are not familiar with the language. 
  
It is recommended that specific unfair practices be identified as criminal offences under the 
CP(FT)A. Like Hong Kong, it should at least identify the more common and contumelious 
practices.235 Based on the 2016 CP(FT)A’s general definition of unfair practice and the list of 
specific practices in the Second Schedule, the following could be specifically identified: 
 
 Unconscionable conduct;236 
 Wrongly accepting payment;237 
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 Bait and switch;238 
 Bait advertising;239 
 Unsolicited consumer agreements;240 
 Deceptive and misleading omissions241 or representations as to any material aspect of the 
goods or services or the relevant transaction;242 and 
 Aggressive commercial practices.243 
Notably, most, if not all, of the above comprise conduct criminalised under the Hong 
Kong or Australian regimes.244 It is further recommended that the Singapore 
Government impose imprisonment (apart from fines) as a possible sanction, like Hong 
Kong does, for the greater deterrent potential. Significantly, although Australia 
currently does not impose custodial sentences, the recent 2017 Australian Consumer 
Law Review noted that there could be circumstances where such sentences were 
appropriate and that the relevant consumer affairs agencies would monitor if a change 
in this direction was justified.245 
 
Even so, criminal prosecution should be reserved for the most blatant and egregious. 
Importantly, to meet the practical concerns for a ‘rapid stop to the illegal conduct’, 
civil pecuniary penalties should be considered as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution. Indeed, in Australia, the limits of criminal prosecution paved the way for 
the introduction of civil pecuniary penalties (to strip the trader of the profits of his 
illegal conduct) during the 2008 review of the Australian Consumer Policy 
Framework.246 Requiring proof on a balance of probabilities rather than beyond 
reasonable doubt, it allows for relatively quicker action against errant traders and has 
equal deterrent force.247  
 
Thus, the authors further recommend that civil pecuniary penalties be made available 
in respect of the same specific unfair practices to be identified under the CP(FT)A, as 
an alternative to criminal prosecution. SPRING should be empowered to apply to 
court for civil pecuniary penalties to be imposed instead of referring the matter to the 
police in cases where a quick stop to the unfair practice is needed and a strong 
deterrent signal sent. For even stronger deterrence, civil pecuniary penalties could be 
coupled with court orders to disqualify incorrigible traders or complicit individuals 
from managing corporations for a given period.248 These civil options should provide 
the necessary incentive for errant traders to enter into VCAs and abide by their terms. 
Indeed, the upper limit of the monetary penalties, whether criminal fines or civil 
pecuniary penalties, must be set high enough so that ‘a trader, acting rationally and in 
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its own best interest, would not be prepared to treat the risk of such a penalty as a 
business cost’.249 
 
B   Remedies 
 
Criminalising certain unfair practices or making perpetrators liable to civil pecuniary 
penalties and/or disqualification orders could deter future misdeeds and result in 
reduced consumer complaints. As mentioned, the prospect of punitive action by 
SPRING could steer traders who have misbehaved towards entering into VCAs and 
abiding by their terms that could include undertakings to compensate the victims. 
Upon breach of the VCA, enabling SPRING to apply for a court order for the trader’s 
compliance with the VCA’s terms would help the victim recover compensation. Even 
where the trader refuses to enter into a VCA, rather than to leave victimised 
consumers to pursue private action against the trader on their own, it would help to 
make court orders for consumer compensation available when injunctions or civil 
pecuniary penalties are ordered at SPRING’s application, or when passing sentence 
for a crime. Like Australia, identified victims should be required to consent to 
SPRING acting on their behalf. In addition, the court should give priority to consumer 
compensation over civil pecuniary penalties or criminal fines if the trader is unable to 
afford both in the particular case. This would go some way towards ensuring 
meaningful consumer remedies. 
 
C   Encouraging Rehabilitation of Errant Traders 
 
The authors also recommend implementing measures aimed at encouraging the 
‘rehabilitation’ of errant traders, and which would ideally have the bonus of reducing 
the number of instances in which the more punitive measures will be required. One 
suggestion might be for the VCA to incorporate the trader’s undertaking to take 
corrective action, including to implement a compliance program to prevent a repeat of 
the unfair practices by its employees and others involved in its business. The VCAs 
entered into should also be made available to the public in a website for transparency 
and to discourage others from unfair practices. This would be akin to the current 
practice in Hong Kong and Australia. 
 
A possible problem is that while traders provide undertakings to the respective 
regulators in Hong Kong and Australia, in Singapore, CASE (and not SPRING) is the 
counter-party to the VCAs. As a non-profit, non-governmental organisation,250 CASE 
is likely to face funding difficulties in monitoring traders for compliance with such 
undertakings. The best scenario would perhaps be to have SPRING as the counter-
party to the VCAs. However, since CASE has historically borne this task, the 
arrangement is unlikely to change. 
 
A workable alternative is to empower the court to make the orders at SPRING’s 
application. SPRING would then be the agency tasked with monitoring compliance, 
which coheres with its existing role. The range of court orders SPRING could apply 
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250  See Consumers Association of Singapore, Introduction, <https://www.case.org.sg/aboutus.aspx>. 
  
 
for should be widened to include any or a combination of the following as is 
appropriate and proportionate to deal with the case at hand:  
 non-punitive orders to implement a compliance program or perform community service to 
counter the unfair practice committed, at the trader’s expense;251 
 injunction orders against the trader and complicit individuals; 
 where a VCA exists, an order to comply with its terms; 
 orders for consumer compensation; and 
 orders publicising the injunction status of the trader and complicit individuals, at their 
personal expense. 
It is suggested that the orders to publicise be made against the trader and/or complicit 
individuals under injunction only if there is an urgent need to protect other consumers 
from becoming victimised. These may be general or targeted as is appropriate. 
However, the authors recommend a reconsideration of the particular forms of targeted 
publicity orders introduced by the 2016 amendments because of the unintended 
problems they could potentially create.252  
 
Breach of these orders will expose the parties to contempt proceedings. Where 
attempts at rehabilitation appear futile, SPRING should be allowed to pursue more 
punitive options such as disqualification orders, civil pecuniary penalties or referring 
the matter for criminal prosecution. Ultimately, an assessment has to be made of the 
trader’s level of cooperation or contrition in deciding on the appropriate course of 
action.  
 
D   Guidelines 
 
As already discussed, published guidelines for how SPRING would implement the 
above measures, including the use of its new powers of investigation, would reassure 
consumers and honest traders alike. Such guidelines should make clear that there are a 
series of escalating measures which SPRING can impose for commission of unfair 
practices, the most onerous of which would only be imposed on egregious traders. 
  
VII Conclusion 
 
The Singapore Government has often cautioned that a careful balance must be struck 
between the needs of consumers and businesses, and that legislation that imposes too 
onerous a burden on businesses is undesirable as the costs could be passed on to 
consumers.253 Although greater costs do indeed accompany greater regulation, one 
should also ask if the higher costs are justified by the need for more robust consumer 
protection. Indeed, one wonders if the 2016 regime would make much difference to 
the Vietnamese tourist mentioned at the beginning, since he would still not be able to 
obtain full compensation under the 2016 regime. 
                                                 
251  In the 2017 ACL Review, above n 245, 90-1 [3.2.2], Proposal 19 recommends that the ACCC be empowered to nominate 
a third party to give effect to the community service order in cases where the trader is not trusted or not qualified to 
carry out the order. Singapore should consider this too if the recommendation is accepted. 
252  See the discussion in Part IVC1 above. 
253  See, eg, Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 10 November 2003, vol 76 at col 3355 (then Minister for MTI Mr Raymond 
Lim Siang) then Minister for MTI Mr Raymond Lim Siang Keat said: ‘we do not want to over-regulate and add to 
business costs’; Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 13 September 2016, vol 94 at 68 (Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh 
Koon), current Minister for MTI Dr Koh Poh Koon stated: ‘We are conscious of the need to take a balanced approach, 
as overly onerous measures can impose unnecessary business costs which would ultimately be passed on to customers.’ 
  
 
 
Thus, while the authors agree that the 2016 introduction of investigatory powers, 
enhancements to court powers, and remedies have added to the consumer protection 
regime in Singapore, the regime remains inadequate. More can be done to provide a 
more robust and comprehensive regime. In this regard, Singapore can learn from the 
Hong Kong and Australian experiences. In particular, certain unfair practices should 
be criminalised with custodial sentences as a possible sanction, in addition to fines. 
As an alternative, civil pecuniary penalties, which could be coupled with orders 
disqualifying errant parties from managing corporations, should be made available. 
To encourage reform, SPRING should be empowered to apply for a greater range of 
court orders, which should include orders for the trader to take remedial action to 
counter the unfair practice committed. Meaningful consumer remedies could be 
achieved if the courts are empowered to order compensation for aggrieved consumers 
when imposing injunctions, civil pecuniary penalties or sentences. Finally, published 
guidelines could clarify the Singapore Government’s approach to consumer protection 
regulation. 
 
